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Constitutional Criminal Procedure
by James P. Fleissner*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys significant 1995 decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in the field commonly referred
to as "Constitutional Criminal Procedure." The primary focus of this
branch of criminal procedure is on the interpretation of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. In selecting notable
cases from 1995, the author looked for important interpretations of legal
tests, rulings in cases of first impression, and opinions on close or
controversial questions.
I have endeavored to provide criminal
practitioners with a useful "briefing" on recent significant developments
in the Eleventh Circuit. Furthermore, I hope that the analysis and
critique of the cases surveyed will constitute a modest contribution to
the dialogue concerning the judicial branch's interpretation of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights that are the foundation of the criminal
justice system.
Is there a theme that characterizes these 1995 decisions of the
Eleventh Circuit? Of course, it is difficult to discern any single, clear
analytical thread running through a year's decisions concerning a
number of complex issues. It is fashionable to render a judgment about
whether a court's decisions reflect a pro-law enforcement or pro-defense
tendency, and perhaps never more fashionable than now. The recent
public controversy concerning a suppression order entered, and then
withdrawn, by a federal district judge in New York has brought
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Marquette University (B.A., 1979); University of Chicago Law School (J.D., 1986). Former
Chief of the General Crimes Section, Office of the United States Attorney, Northern
District of Illinois. The author is a member of the Bar of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
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Constitutional criminal procedure to the forefront.' Indeed, it appears
that the philosophy of federal judges on these issues will be a prominent
issue in the coming political season of 1996.2 In the parlance of the
political sound bite, the tenor of the Eleventh Circuit's 1995 cases in the
field of constitutional criminal procedure was "pro-law enforcement."
While that label omits much, including some government losses, it
captures a general truth. Nineteen-ninety-five was a good year for
prosecutors in the Eleventh Circuit. Having rendered that judgment
after a fashion, it is important not to overdo it by drawing more
sweeping conclusions that may unfairly impute motives or imply purely
outcome-oriented decision making.8 The critique of the decisions of a
court is most fair, and meaningful, when addressed to specific issues.

II. THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT

A.

Investigatory Stop and Frisk Cases
The Eleventh Circuit issued several noteworthy decisions concerning
the validity of investigatory stops and protective pat-down searches. The
first was United States v. Gibson,4 a case involving the recurring
problem of investigatory stops that are based on anonymous tips to the
police. In Gibson, the police received an anonymous telephone call
reporting that there were two armed African-American men at Tiny's
Bar in Miami.5 The tipster described one of the men as wearing a white
shirt and beige pants and the other man as wearing a long black trench
coat.6 Two policemen arrived at the bar minutes later and saw an
African-American man wearing a white shirt and beige pants standing

1. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Judge Finds Wit Tested by Criticism;Issue of DrugSearch
Ruling Draws Angry Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, February 7, 1996, at B1; Alison Mitchell,
ClintonDefends His Criticism of a New York Judge'sRuling, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1996, at
A12; Don Van Natta, Jr., Drug Case Reversal, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1996, at B3.
2. See Dan Balz, Dole Warns ofLiberalJudiciary;ClintonAppointees Soft on Criminals,
MajorityLeader Says, WASHINGTON POST, April 20, 1996, at Al (noting Dole's promise to
make judicial appointments a central theme in the presidential campaign and the
Administration's statement that President Clinton has a record of appointing moderate
judges).
3. See, e.g., Andrea Wilson, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 45 MERCER L. REV.
1243, 1258 (1994) ("The trend in the Eleventh Circuit is no different than in most circuit
courts of appeals. Personal rights and individual freedoms are abridged as required to
fight the war on crime. This is particularly true in drug cases, where it often seems that
the end justifies the means.").
4. 64 F.3d 617 (11th Cir. 1995).
5. Id. at 619.
6. Id.

1996]

CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

767

outside the bar.7 As the police approached, the man in the white shirt
and beige pants walked away, and the police were not able to confront
him.' The police officers then entered the bar and quickly spotted an
African-American in a trench coat; that man was defendant Gibson.
As the officers approached Gibson, they saw Gibson turn to face them
and reach behind his back with both hands.10 One officer took out his
weapon and pointed it at Gibson while saying that the officers believed
Gibson had a firearm." The other officer frisked Gibson and found an
ammunition clip in the pocket of the trench coat and a firearm tucked
behind Gibson's back in the waist area.12 Gibson was arrested and
later charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. 8 The
officers testified that the decision to initiate the stop and frisk of Gibson
was based exclusively on the anonymous tip and a general knowledge
that the carrying of weapons was common in the neighborhood."'
Gibson appealed from the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress.'" Gibson contended that the officers lacked reasonable
articulable suspicion to believe that he was committing a crime or that
he was dangerous. The court of appeals held that the stop and frisk of
What is surprising about Gibson is not the
Gibson was justified.'
outcome, but the court's reasoning, which appears to endorse an
expansive view of the authority of the police to stop and frisk suspects.
The most simple reasoning supporting the holding would have emphasized the importance of Gibson's reaction to being approached by the
police. Under this analysis, the court could have found that no seizure
occurred until Gibson's reaction to seeing the police. Up to that point,
there had been no "physical force or show of authority" that "in some
way restrained the liberty" of Gibson.' 7 Put another way, the encounter between the police and Gibson had not yet ripened into a seizure.' 8
However, Gibson's turning and reaching behind his back significantly

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 618-19.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 619.
16. Id. at 624.
17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
18. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1983) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(setting forth police conduct, such as displaying weapons, that could cause a person to
believe he was not free to leave).
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changed the complexion of the encounter by corroborating the presence
of a weapon and creating a perception of immediate danger. In fact, the
officers responded defensively to Gibson's threatening move. Once
Gibson made a move that the trained officers (correctly) viewed as a
reach towards a weapon, it is easy to conclude that the officers had
reasonable articulable suspicion to support both an investigative stop
and a protective pat-down search. 9 This approach to resolving the case
would simply find that Gibson's reaction to the approach of the officers
put the officers "over the top": At that moment, the officers had not only
the anonymous tip, but confirming and threatening conduct. Under the
circumstances, the conduct of the officers looks reasonable. Curiously,
the court did not emphasize Gibson's reactive conduct, referring to it
mention of the potential
once as an "innocent" detail and relegating
20
significance of the conduct to a footnote.
The reasoning employed by the court appears to sanction investigative
stops based on anonymous tips, even with minimal corroboration,
especially where the tip concerns potentially dangerous individuals. The
court addressed the Supreme Court's decision in Alabama v. White,2 '
which upheld an investigative stop based on an anonymous tip in a
"close case," emphasizing that police investigation confirmed not only
innocent details in the tip, but aspects of the tip predicting future
behavior of the suspect.22

In Gibson, the court of appeals refused to

interpret White as requiring the corroboration of predictive information
in anonymous tips in order for reasonable suspicion to exist. 23

The

court concluded that a tip could be corroborated based on present rather
than future actions. 24 But the "present actions" corroborated by the
police who stopped Gibson were mostly innocent details, such as the race
and clothing of the men and the departure of the man standing outside.
The remarkable feature of the court's reasoning is its emphasis on the
potential for danger to the officers based on the content of the anonymous tip. After construing White, the court stated: "More importantly,
the anonymous tip concerned the presence of two potentially armed

19. The opinion of the court of appeals in Gibson does not specify the precise offense
that the officers were investigating The anonymous tip reported two armed men, and so
it is safe to assume that the officers were concerned with enforcing a state or local weapons
possession statute. There is no indication that the officers had in mind a possible violation
of the federal law under which Gibson was ultimately prosecuted, inasmuch as the officers
had no information that the armed men might have prior felony convictions.
20. Gibson, 64 F.3d at 622-25 n.8.
21. 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
22. Id. at 332.
23. 64 F.3d at 619-23.
24. Id. at 623.
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individuals in a public establishment. This fact raised the stakes for the
officers involved because they not only had to worry about their own
personal safety, but that of 20 to 40 innocent bystanders who were also
present."25 The court's great concern for police safety during encounters with potentially armed individuals is admirable and well intentioned, but it appears to have led the court to condone a stop and frisk
based on the content of the tip and the unparticularized hunch of the
officers.2" In fact, the court's assessment of the risk confronted by the
officers in Gibson is a bit exaggerated. The tip referred only to two
armed men and there was no indication that any violence was in the
offing. Based on the report of weapons possession, the court went so far
as to state, "The police officers were compelled to act immediately upon
their arrival at Tiny's Bar."" The court's opinion may be read as
sanctioning stops and frisks based on anonymous tips that correctly
describe individuals and allege possession of weapons, especially when
the police have "the knowledge that guns were common to the area."28
This license seems too permissive, allowing investigative stops and
protective searches without reasonable articulable suspicion and opening
the door to abuse of anonymous tips. 29 Furthermore, the court's logic

could easily be extended to other cases involving some risk of danger,
further eroding the reasonable suspicion standard.3'
United States v. Lee al also involved an anonymous tip. In Lee, the
Mobile police received an anonymous call reporting drug dealing.3 2 In
addition, the police met with the caller on one occasion.33 The tipster
provided a description of the suspect, the suspect's nickname ("Ponytail"), the name and address of the suspect's motel, a description of the
suspect's car and its tag number, the location where the car was parked
and that the suspect was in the company of a woman and a child. 4

25. Id.
26.

See id. at 623-24 (expressing concern over police safety).

27. Id. at 623.
28. Id. at 624.
29. With respect to the possible abuse of anonymous tips, the court noted the existence
of laws criminalizing false reports to the police. Id. at 625. Of course, such laws are
difficult to enforce when the report is anonymous.
30. For example, it could be argued that the threat created by illegal narcotics creates
the kind of danger emphasized by Gibson. The court of appeals took note of the decision
in Gibson in a drug case, United States v. Lee, 68 F.3d 1267, 1272 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995).
The court stated, "Whether the Gibson rationale applies to a drug case is a question we
leave open for another day." Id. at 1271 n.4.
31. 68 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 1995).
32. Id. at 1269.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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The tipster also told police that it was Ponytail's usual practice to meet
drug dealers at his motel and travel in their vehicles instead of his,
which bore an out of county tag. 5 The police went to the suspect's
motel and made observations consistent with the information in the tip,
including seeing the suspect carrying a paper bag and leaving the motel
in a car other than the car described in the tip. 6 The police stopped
the car and conducted protective pat-down searches.3 7 The persons in
the car were charged with dealing crack.38
The defendants argued that the police did not have a sufficient basis
to stop the vehicle.39 The district court denied the suppression motion
and the court of appeals affirmed in Lee.40 The court noted that the
test is whether there was reasonable suspicion considering the totality
of the circumstances. 41 As in Gibson, the court was faced with interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Alabama v. White. 42 That
decision emphasized the importance of confirming predictive information
in anonymous tips, which demonstrates "inside information" and a
"special familiarity" with the suspect's affairs. 3 In Lee, the court of
appeals first distinguished White on the ground that the tip in Lee was
not completely anonymous." The court found that "the informant's
willingness to meet personally with police adds credibility and reliability
to the information he relayed with respect to the alleged criminal
activity.
Then the court engaged in a seemingly straightforward
application of White and found that the tip in Lee included information
predicting the suspect's future behavior that was later confirmed by
The court stressed the confirmation of the
police observation."
suspect's "business routine. 4 7 However, like White, this is a close case.
The description of the suspect's "business routine" was comprised of
conduct that, on its face, was innocent. The lesson for law enforcement
officers is to try to elicit information on a suspect's routine from an
anonymous tipster. If the tip accurately predicts behavior of any kind,
the court may well look on that as a sufficient indication of inside
35.

Id.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1270.
Id.
Id. at 1270, 1272.
Id. at 1270-71.

42.

496 U.S. 325 (1990).

43. Id. at 332.
44. 68 F.3d at 1272 n.4.
45. Id. at 1271 n.3.
46, Id. at 1271-72.

47. Id. at 1272.

1996]

CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

771

knowledge by the tipster. And when the investigatory stop yields
significant evidence, courts will be tempted to give an expansive reading
to White.
Perhaps the most remarkable of the court's decisions concerning
This case
investigatory stops was United States v. Blackman."
involved a prosecution of four defendants for robbing several banks in
Florida. Bahamian officials put the FBI in contact with a reliable
informant who claimed that his friends had robbed the banks. The
informant gave descriptions of his friends and their address.4 s It is
significant that the government did not seek to obtain an arrest warrant
or a search warrant, and the government apparently conceded on appeal
that the information from the informant and a surveillance of the
address provided did not amount to probable cause.so It was also
uncontested on appeal that the information in the hands of the FBI
before the encounter did amount to reasonable suspicion sufficient to
justify an investigatory stop of the suspects. The FBI subsequently
initiated an encounter with the suspects, during which one of the
suspects admitted involvement and implicated the others, leading to
their arrests and confessions,' The issue in the case was whether the
conduct of the FBI agents during the encounter with the suspects
exceeded the permissible limits of an investigatory stop and amounted
to an arrest, thereby requiring the reading of Miranda rights to the
suspects prior to interrogation. The stakes were high: If the encounter
amounted to an arrest, the statement of at least the first suspect to
make incriminating statements would have to be suppressed and the
other evidence obtained against that suspect would be fruit of the
poisonous tree. 2
The court of appeals was faced with the following facts. The FBI sent
agents to the address identified by the informant for the purpose of
investigation, not to arrest the suspects.5" The contingent included ten
to twelve armed FBI agents in raid jackets." The street in front of the

48. 66 F.3d 1572 (11th Cir. 1995).
49. Id. at 1576.
50. Id. at 1584 (Eisele, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1574.
52. Id. at 1584 (Eisele, J., dissenting). As the dissent pointed out, the first suspect
gave a statement implicating the other three, thereby providing the agents with probable
cause to arrest. Id. Thus the appropriate suppression order would be limited to the
defendant whose pre-Miranda admission led to the discovery of additional evidence as to
him.
53. Id. at 1574.
54. Id. at 1580 (Eisele, J., dissenting).
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residence was blocked off by several law enforcement vehicles."5 Using
a loudspeaker, an FBI agent announced: "[Tihis is the FBI, we would
like the occupants in this particular unit of this particular residence to
come out the front door one by one."" Another agent shouted: "FBI,
please come out, keep your hands above your head as you come out one
at a time[!]"5 7 When the first of the suspects emerged an agent shouted
"FBI, stop[!]" 8 Soon the other three came out, and all four were
handcuffed and placed on the ground. 9 At this point, the first suspect
to come out asked what the FBI wanted, and an agent replied that it
involved the robbery of a specific bank the previous July." The suspect
responded, "O.K., I will tell you about that."
Only then was the
suspect read his rights.62 Following being advised
of his rights, the
63
suspect confessed and implicated the other three.
In Blackman, the court held that the events leading up to the
admission by the first suspect constituted a valid investigatory stop and
protective search." In setting forth the legal test, the court stated, "No
brightline test separates an investigatory stop from an arrest. Instead,
whether a seizure has become too intrusive to be an investigatory stop
and must be considered an arrest depends on the degree of intrusion,
considering all the circumstances.'
The court rejected the argument
that the critical test for determining if an encounter amounts to an
arrest is whether a reasonable person would not believe he was free to
leave. 6 Rather, the court emphasized the need for the law enforcement
agents to be cautious when investigating a violent crime by multiple
offenders.6 7 In the court's view, this was an investigatory stop in which
the FBI agents did not intend to arrest the suspects, the suspects
voluntarily left the residence, and the agents took reasonable steps to
protect themselves.6
In a persuasive dissenting opinion, JudgeEisele took issue with the
panel opinion's reasoning. Judge Eisele criticized the apparent

55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.

58. Id.
59. Id.

60. Id.
61.

Id. at 1574.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1576-77.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1576 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1576-77 n.4.
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abandonment of the "reasonable person/free to leave" test, stating that
perhaps the appropriate formulation should be whether a reasonable
person would understand the restraint on freedom of movement to be of
a degree ordinarily associated with an arrest.69 After setting forth the
facts, many of which did not find their way into the panel opinion, Judge
Eisele questioned the conclusions that the suspects' exit from the
residence was voluntary and that the restraint did not amount to an
arrest.7" Judge Eisele stated, "But if an armed officer, wearing a raid
jacket, violently seizes a person, forces him to the ground, and places
him in handcuffs (or other restraints), would not that person reasonably
believe he was under arrest? Of course he would."7" This argument
has great force because the suspects must have believed they were under
arrest and would not soon be free to leave. Indeed, as Judge Eisele
was not qualitatively different
pointed out, the restraint of the suspects
72
after they were placed under arrest.
Two other decisions in the area of investigatory stops are worthy of
note. In United States v. Gonzalez,73 the court of appeals considered an
appeal from a denial of suppression order in a case in which the
defendant claimed that police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
detain him briefly for questioning. 7" The questioning led to the
defendant voluntarily handing over counterfeit currency, after which the
defendant was arrested and confessed to counterfeiting crimes. 75 The
gist of the defendant's argument was that he was merely present with
another person who passed counterfeit notes at a bar, and that officers
lacked reasonable suspicion to question him. 76 The court concluded
that the proximity of the defendant to his companion, whom police had
probable cause to arrest (based on the bartender's report that the
companion passed the bill), was properly considered "as a factor in
assessing reasonable suspicion.
United States v. Cruz-Hernandez78 concerned the recurring issue of
when a roving immigration enforcement agent has reasonable suspicion
to stop a vehicle to verify a suspect's citizenship. Of course, the court

69. Id. at 1581 (Eisele, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1579-82.
71. Id. at 1582.

72. Id. at 1583.
73. 70 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 1996 WL 207476 (U.S., May 20, 1996)
(No. 95-8617).
74. 70 F.3d at 1238.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.at 1238.
78. 62 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1995).
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noted the familiar test, which requires a border patrol agent to
articulate specific facts giving rise to his suspicion and requires the
reviewing court to assess the reasonability of the agent's reasons under
the totality of the particular circumstances.79 The court paid deference
to the experience of the agent and noted that although the stop did not
occur near the border, the area was near a place where undocumented
aliens were known to live and work.8" Besides those general factors,
the agent enumerated the following factors concerning Cruz-Hernandez
and his vehicle: The suspect was Hispanic; he was dressed in clothes
typical of an undocumented alien worker; he averted his gaze from the
agent and appeared nervous; his vehicle (a van) was typical of those
used for transporting illegal aliens; and the vehicle had an out of state
license plate.8 The court conceded that each of these factors alone
would be insufficient to establish the requisite reasonable articulable
suspicion. 2 However, the court affirmed the denial of the defendant's
suppression motion, holding that the agent had reasonable articulable
suspicion to stop Cruz-Hernandez.' When one scrutinizes each of the
specific facts indicating criminal activity by Cruz-Hernandez, the court's
conclusion seems to be that the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. Other than the characteristics of Cruz-Hernandez and his vehicle,
the only other factors are the experience of the agent and the known
presence of aliens in the area, factors that will almost always be present,
and that also could not independently support a finding of reasonable
suspicion. The specific factors enumerated by the agent in CruzHernandez, such as Hispanic appearance and work clothing, could easily
be portrayed as being no more than innocent facts giving rise to a hunch.
The lesson from Cruz-Hernandez is that experienced border patrol
agents operating in areas populated by aliens may stop suspects based
on very limited indicia of criminal activity and that these stops will
rarely be held invalid in this Circuit.
B. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
United States v. Robinson" presented the court with the question of
whether the use of infrared thermal detection techniques to detect
marijuana cultivation is an unconstitutional search. The investigation
of defendant Robinson began when drug enforcement agents discovered

79.
80,
81.
82.

Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1355-56.
Id.
Id. at 1356.

83. Id.
84.

62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995),
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that Robinson had ordered a number of special lamps commonly used for
indoor marijuana growing."6 Agents learned that after the lamps were
delivered, Robinson's utility bills jumped.8 " In addition, the agents
discovered that Robinson had not filed income tax returns.8 7 The
agents used a helicopter to conduct a surveillance using a Forward
Looking Infrared Receiver ("FLIR"), which indicated that the amount of
heat emanating from Robinson's house was much greater than the
surrounding homes.8" All of this information was used to secure a
search warrant, which resulted in the seizure of evidence that led to the
conviction of Robinson on marijuana and firearms charges.89 Robinson
argued unsuccessfully to the district court that the FLIR search of his
house violated the Fourth Amendment."
The court of appeals stated the relevant legal test as follows: "[A]
party alleging an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment
must establish both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy
to succeed ....

Thus, we must determine whether Robinson had a

subjective expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
objectively reasonable." 1 The court held that Robinson failed both
parts of the test.2 The court's analysis of the objective portion of the
test, which was sufficient to support the court's affirmance of the
suppression order, was persuasive. The court concluded that society
does not accept Robinson's expectation of privacy in the release of heat
from his home as objectively reasonable.93 The court reasoned that the
FLIR test does not reveal the sort of intimate, private detail that
underlies the protection of the zone of privacy in a home.94 The court
also pointed out that there was not intrusion into Robinson's home,
because the FLIR surveillance detected heat that had risen from the
house.9" The court's discussion of the objective portion of the test has
a solid foundation of precedent, such as cases involving'scents detected
by drug sniffing dogs."

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1327-28.
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1328-30.
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1329-30.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
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The court's analysis of the subjective part of the test was highly
questionable. In fact, Judge Edmondson wrote a brief concurrence in
97
which "considerable doubt" as to the court's analysis was expressed.
The difficulty with the court's discussion of the subjective part of the test
can be seen in its treatment of a prior precedent, United States v.
Ford," another case involving a Fourth Amendment challenge to the
use of thermal infrared heat detector. In Ford, the court had found no
subjective expectation of privacy in the heat generated by a marijuana
growing operation in a case where the defendant had vented the heat."
The problem in applying Ford was that Robinson did not vent the heat
from his house."° Thus the court asked "whether inaction can be as
revealing regarding the subjective expectation of privacy as action."'0 '
The court noted that the record did not show that Robinson took any
action to prevent the heat from rising from his house." 2 From Robinson's inaction, the court inferred "his lack of concern" about the detection
of the heat."3 This reasoning is problematic. One problem is that the
record shows that Robinson did do something that may have been
designed to reduce the heat emissions: He did not vent the heat.
Another problem is that it in unclear what else Robinson might have
done to reduce the heat emissions. The court noted the lack of effort,
but not the feasibility of an effort to limit the emissions. The court's
reasoning has a Catch-22 quality to it. If Robinson vents the heat, it
means he does not care about detection of the heat. If he does not vent
the heat, his failure to take other unspecified steps to contain the heat
emissions means he does not care. Of course, persons involved in
significant criminal enterprises usually intend to conceal the clues to
their conduct, and Robinson apparently was willing to enclose his
operation within his house and put up with the heat. Of course, it is
possible that Robinson had no knowledge of the danger of the heat being
detected and truly could not have cared less. But the court's conclusion
as to Robinson's subjective state of mind based on his inaction in trying
to stem the heat (assuming the failure to vent is not such an action)
seems unsound.
In another case, the court confronted the issue of whether a company
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in shredded documents found in
a search of a dumpster within the "commercial curtilage" of the
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1332 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 993.
62 F.3d at 1328.

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1996]

777

company." 4 United States v. Hall..5 was a prosecution of the chairman of a company called Bet-Air, Inc. for illegally selling restricted
military spare parts to Iran. During the investigation, a United States
Customs agent entered Bet-Air's property and searched a dumpster
located in a parking area, some forty yards onto the property. °6 The
shredded documents included papers that the company previously had
promised to turn over to the government pursuant to a subpoena.0 7
The discovery led to an application for a search warrant and the
recovery of further damning evidence. 0 8 The defendant claimed that
the search of the dumpster violated the Fourth Amendment because BetAir had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shredded documents."° Once again, the legal test applied was whether Bet-Air had
a subjective expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
objectively reasonable.110 The court quickly concluded that Bet-Air had
manifested the required subjective expectation of privacy: Indeed, the
in garbage bag, and placed in the
documents were shredded, sealed
1
'
property.
Bet-Air's
on
dumpster
The application of the objective portion of the test hinged on the
concept of "commercial curtilage." The defendant argued that Bet-Air's
expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable because the investigating agents had to trespass onto Bet-Air's property, and the dumpster
was located near to Bet-Air's offices." 2 With respect to the claim of
trespass, the court dismissed the notion that the law of trespass governs
the scope of Fourth Amendment protections." 3 The court stated that
"the owner of commercial property has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in those areas immediately surrounding the property only if
affirmative steps have been taken to exclude the public."" 4 The court
found that Bet-Air had failed to take steps to exclude the public, and
that failure was even more significant because the evidence in question
was garbage thrown in a dumpster." 5 The court stated, "It is common
knowledge that commercial dumpsters have long been a source of fruitful

104. United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 1995).
105. 47 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 1995).
106. Id. at 1093.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1094.
at 1093-94.
at 1095.
at 1096.
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exploration for scavengers."" 6 The court's analysis distinguished
between the concept of curtilage in the residential and commercial
settings." 7 In the residential setting, the Fourth Amendment protects
as curtilage those areas near a house that are associated with the
private activities of the resident."8 Without committing to embracing
the concept of commercial curtilage, the court found that "it would, at a
minimum, require that the commercial proprietor take affirmative steps
to exclude the public."119
C.

Entry to Arrest/Protective Sweeps
United States v. Magluta120 presented the court with important
questions regarding when agents may enter a residence to execute an
arrest warrant and what standard of review governs appellate consideration of suppression orders in entry-to-arrest cases. Magluta involved
the execution of arrest warrants in a narcotics case. Both Magluta and
Lorenzo were charged in the case, but authorities could not locate them
for several months.12 1 Eventually, informants provided authorities
122
with Magluta's address and said that Lorenzo was a frequent visitor.
Surveillance of the residence showed that it was occupied and that
vehicles were parked there. One witness said a man who looked like
Magluta had driven one of the parked vehicles, but there was no clear
indication that Magluta was at home.'" Agents saw one car leave
with a man resembling Lorenzo, and a witness identified a picture of
Lorenzo as a person who frequented the property. 24 When the car
with the person resembling Lorenzo returned to the residence several
hours later, the agents decided to move in to make arrests. 2 The
entry into the residence and a protective sweep led to the arrests of
Lorenzo and Magluta as well as a number of items of evidence in plain
view.'26 A search warrant was obtained for the premises, and additional evidence was discovered. 2 The defendants moved to suppress
the evidence from the searches 'on the ground that the agents lacked

116. Id.
117.

Id. at 1097.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120.

44 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir. 1995).

121.

Id. at 1531-32.

122. Id. at 1532.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1532-33.
Id. at 1533.
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"reason to believe" that Magluta was within the residence as required by
Payton v. New York," which recognized that an arrest warrant carries
the authority to enter a suspect's residence to arrest "when there is
reason to believe the suspect is within." 2 ' Although the district court
found that the agents had probable cause to believe that Magluta lived
in the house, it ordered the evidence suppressed because there was
insufficient reason to- believe Magluta was there at the time of the
search. 30 The United States appealed the suppression order. 3 '
The first issue on appeal was the meaning of Payton's "reason to
3 2 Does Payton require probable cause to believe that the
believe" test."
suspect is home at the time of the entry or was the "reason to believe"
standard require less than probable cause? The district court had
bypassed this legal issue and held that the evidence was insufficient
The court of appeals began its inquiry by
under either approach.'
noting the Supreme Court's careful choice of words, and stating that it
was likely a "conscious effort" in choosing the phrase "reason to believe"
over "probable cause." " Still, the lack of clear precedent left the court
with the task of defining the "reason to believe" standard.3 5 The court
held that "in order for law enforcement officials to enter a residence to
execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of law enforcement agents, when
viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location
to be searched is the suspect's dwelling, and that the suspect is within
the residence at the time of entry."'3 6 The court's answer, which it
characterized as "practical" and "common sense," was that the legal
standard is less than probable cause, akin to the "reasonable suspicion"
standard in investigatory stops."'
Having defined the test under Payton, the court moved on to the issue
of the proper standard of review. The court acknowledged the familiar
standard: Rulings on motions to suppress involve mixed questions of
fact and law."3 Factual findings are reviewed for clear error; legal

128.
129.

445 U.S. 573 (1980).
44 F.3d at 1533 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 603).

130. Id
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1536.
133.
134.
135.
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137.
138.
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findings are reviewed de novo. 3 9 The court noted, however, that
where the facts are not in dispute, the question of whether those facts
meet a given legal standard is a legal issue. 40 In Magluta, there were
no credibility determinations at issue and the facts were not in dispute,
therefore the court held that the district's court's finding that the agents
lacked "reason to believe" Magluta was home would be reviewed de
novo."4 ' The court concluded that the agents had sufficient "reason to
believe" that Magluta was home and reversed the suppression order.'4 2
The court mentioned, among other factors, that Magluta had been linked
to one of the parked vehicles and that Lorenzo's visit to Magluta's
residence suggested that Magluta was home. 43 The court's ruling
paved the way for the government to introduce the fruits of the
protective sweep and the subsequent search warrant.'" On the whole,
Magluta represents a significant development in clarifying the Payton
test as well as signalling a somewhat less deferential approach in
reviewing the grant of suppression motions.
United States v. Hromada"' discussed the scope of permissive
protective sweeps conducted while executing an arrest warrant. Officers
went to Hromada's home to arrest him for selling marijuana. 14 The
officers knocked loudly and announced their purpose; when Hromada
appeared at a window but did not move to open the door, the officers
broke through the door.'47 The court found that the officers' protective
sweep of the house, which netted drug evidence, was justified, especially
because Hromada was known to work with other persons in his drug
business.'" The court noted the brevity of the protective sweep (about

a minute) and the fact that the officers only looked in places large
enough to harbor a person. 49 The court stated that the test for
determining whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment is one
of objective reasonableness, not an evaluation of the subjective intent of

139. Id.
140. Id. at 1536-37.

141. Id. at 1537.
142. Id. at 1537-39.
143. Id.
144. Id.

145. 49 F.3d 685 (11th Cir. 1995).
146. Id. at 687.
147.

Id. The court found that the officers' entry after Hromada failed for about a

minute to open the door did not violate the federal "knock and announce" statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3109, which allows entry when admittance is refused. Id. at 698. The court emphasized
the potential danger to the officers in waiting longer. Id. at 690 n.9.
148. Id. at 689-90.
149. Id. at 690.
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That was an important point in the court's analysis,
the agents.'
because Hromada claimed that the protective search was a subterfuge,
citing the testimony of one of the officers that the goal of his investigation was to search the house.15 The court concluded, "Just because
the police officers were glad that they could capitalize on the opportunity
by incidentally seeing what was in plain view is of no moment."15

D. Exigent Circumstances
In two decisions, the Eleventh Circuit approved warrantless searches
based on exigent circumstances involving the possibility of destruction
or loss of evidence. In United States v. Reid 53 and United States v.
Villabona-Garnica,'"'both drug cases, the court approved warrantless
searches because investigating agents feared that drugs or other
evidence might be lost. In Reid, the court noted that the need to resort
to the exigent circumstances exception will arise in drug cases because
the evidence can be so easily destroyed. 5 The facts in Reid were not
particularly troublesome: The agents had substantial information
indicating drug activity in a "stash house" and plans were in the works
to obtain a search warrant.'56 Before the agents, working with a
district attorney, could get the warrant, a van pulled into the garage of
the house in question and the garage door was closed.' 57 One of the
investigators had information concerning the purchase by the drug
dealers of a van with secret compartments, and it was feared that the
drugs in the house would be moved.5 5 Furthermore, rush hour was
approaching in the neighborhood, which created the possibility of traffic
that would make it more difficult to follow anyone fleeing the house with
contraband. 5 9 In consultation with the prosecutor, a decision was
made to enter and secure the house."6 A substantial quantity of drugs
and other evidence was recovered.'' A warrant was obtained shortly
thereafter. 62

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 690-91.
Id.
Id.
69 F.3d 1109 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 1996 WL 226764 (1996).
63 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1341 (1996).
69 F.3d at 1113.
Id. at 1111-12.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1114.
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Id. at 1112.
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While Reid seems a reasonable application of the exigent circumstances exception, Villabona-Garnicademonstrates how the exception can be
stretched to allow the admission of captured drugs. In VillabonaGarnica,the government discovered drugs in two containers coming into
the country. The government made a controlled delivery of the
containers to four men who made the pick-up in a truck and proceeded
to the apartment of one of the men." After a while, one of the four
emerged from the cargo compartment of the truck and started handing
paint buckets to the others, and the buckets were all carried into the
apartment.' During the stop at the apartment, surveillance agents
saw a teenager speak briefly to the four men.'
One agent testified6
that the teenager helped carry paint buckets into the apartment.'
Later, the four men drove away from the apartment and were stopped;
the cocaine was no longer in the truck.167 The agents went to the
apartment and when nobody answered a knock on the door, they broke
in and recovered the cocaine. 16 The government initially conceded
that the agents should have obtained a warrant for the apartment, and
the evidence was suppressed. 169 Later, the government asked for
reconsideration of the suppression order on the ground that the presence
of the fifth person, the teenager, created an exigent circumstance,
namely, the risk that the evidence would be lost. 170 The district court
agreed with the government and ruled that the unaccounted for fifth
person created a serious risk to the evidence.' 7 ' In affirming the
district court's ultimate denial of the suppression motion, the court of
appeals stated that the district court's factual findings were not clearly
erroneous and accepted the legal conclusion that the fifth person created
an exigent circumstance. 7 2 The theory was that the suspects detected
the surveillance and the four men left in the truck with the intent that
the fifth person stay behind and destroy the cocaine.'73 The court of
appeals hedged its bets with a footnote stating that even if no exigent
circumstances existed, the error was harmless.'7 4
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170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

63 F.3d at 1053.
Id. at 1053-54.
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Id. at 1056.
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Sufficiency of ProbableCause Supporting Warrant

75 a case in which the court of appeals
United States v. Foree,"
affirmed the district court's finding that a warrant was supported by
probable cause, is worthy of note because the court of appeals explicitly
found it "a close case, demarcating the outer limits of probable cause in
this context." 76 The warrant at issue in Foree resulted in the seizure
of drug evidence.' 7 7 The warrant was based on information from an
informant who claimed to have seen evidence of marijuana dealing in
the house to be searched."' The informant claimed to know Foree,
who had reportedly had been involved in marijuana smuggling. 7 " The
application for the warrant also stated that the agents had seen the
Finally, the
informant enter the house, establishing her access."s
application contained a bare assertion that the informant was reliable
and corroborated.''
The court of appeals found that the general assertions concerning the
82
The
informant's reliability were not entitled to much weight."
general language about the informant's reliability was boilerplate and
lacked any specificity. The issue thus became the extent of corroboration
There really was very little to corrobofor the informant's claims."
rate the claims of drug activity in the house. There was a report about
And the
Foree's prior involvement in transporting marijuana. '"
agents corroborated the informant's access to the house. 5 The court
of appeals supplemented these sparse facts with an interesting theory:
Because the informant's story, if false, would be disproven by a search,
the informant was unlikely to lie." s The court stated: "As her report
consisted of facts readily verifiable upon a subsequent search by the
police (x number of plants growing in y room), the [informant] was
unlikely to be untruthful, for, if the warrant issued, lies would likely be
discovered in short order and favors falsely curried would dissipate

175. 43 F.3d 1572 (11th Cir. 1995).
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rapidly." 117 This clever (perhaps too clever) argument notwithstanding, the sufficiency of the application for the search warrant seems
highly questionable. Nevertheless, the court of appeals found that the
judge issuing the warrant had a "substantial basis" for her conclusion
that probable cause was present.' The court's remarks that the case
was "close" and at the "outer limits of probable cause" can be interpreted
as a reflection of misgivings with the outcome. Certainly law enforcement officers should take steps to do better than the agents in Foree by
detailing the prior reliability of the informant or taking additional
investigative steps to corroborate the alleged criminal activity in the
place to be searched.
III.

THE FiFTH AMENDMENT

A.

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Eleventh Circuit reversed a heroin smuggling conviction in United
States v. Tenorio. 89 The case began in typical fashion. Tenorio was
intercepted by drug enforcement agents after arriving at Miami
International Airport from Panama."9 The agents became suspicious
of Tenorio's suitcase, which bore characteristics of suitcases used to
smuggle drugs, including an odor of fiberglass resin, which is used to
build compartments within luggage. 9 ' The agents conducted a border
search and discovered heroin in Tenorio's suitcase.'9 Tenorio was
arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. 9 3 After thinking about it
for ten of fifteen minutes, Tenorio signed a form indicating that he did
not intend to waive his rights. 94 Approximately thirty minutes passed
from the initial stop of Tenorio to his signed invocation of his rights.9"
The next day at his court appearance, Tenorio volunteered to the agents
that he didn't know
about the drugs and that someone else had loaned
96

him the suitcase.

The court of appeals reversed because the prosecution used Tenorio's
post-Miranda silence against him in violation of his right to remain

187. Id.
188. Id. at 1576-77.
189. 69 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1995).
190. Id. at 1104.

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1104-05.
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195. Id.
196. Id. at 1105.
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silent and his right to due process.' 97 The government clearly used
Tenorio's silence as the central theme of the prosecution. Tenorio's
silence was used to fill in the most difficult part of the case: the element
of Tenorio's knowledge. One of the investigating agents described
Tenorio's post-Miranda silence and noted that Tenorio "continued to look
unhappy, but not surprised."'98 The agent also testified that Tenorio's
statements in court the next day were the first time Tenorio had offered
any explanation.'" Tenorio's silence also was utilized during the
cross-examination of the defendant and during the prosecution's closing
argument. 200 Although the district court found that the prosecution
was using only Tenorio's pre-Miranda silence, the court of appeals
correctly concluded that the prosecution used the silence of the
defendant both before and after the advice of rights. 20 ' For example,
the prosecutor referred to Tenorio's silence during the half hour after his
arrest and before his written invocation of rights, a portion of which was
a period after the advice of rights. 2 The court of appeals held that
the impermissible use of Tenorio's post-Miranda silence pervaded every
phase of his three day trial, requiring reversal. 203
In a concurring opinion in Tenorio, Judge Edmondson addressed the
issue the majority opinion did not address: Was Tenorio's pre-Miranda
silence properly admitted as evidence of guilt, and, if so, does the
presence of that evidence render the erroneous use of the post-Miranda
silence harmless? 2° Judge Edmondson reviewed the prior decisions
of the court and concluded: "The law of this circuit is settled that
evidence of pre-Miranda silence is admissible in the government's casein-chief as substantive proof of guilt."2 5 However, despite the admissibility of the pre-Miranda silence, Judge Edmondson concluded that the
other evidence in the case was not so strong as to render the improper
use of the post-Miranda silence harmless.2 ° Of course, allowing the
admission of pre-Miranda silence but not post-Miranda silence requires
the trial court, the lawyers, and the jury to perform the sort of "mental
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gymnastics" of which some great jurists have been skeptical. 7 For
example, at a retrial of Tenorio, it would be proper for the prosecutor to
highlight Tenorio's pre-Miranda silence, but improper to argue his guilt
based on the post-Miranda silence. The jury obviously will know that a
period of silence occurred before Tenorio told his story in court the next
day, and they might be inclined to infer guilt from all, and not just part,
of the silence. The rules preventing the prosecutor from explicitly using
the post-Miranda silence are easy to enforce and Tenorio is an example.
What is more difficult is getting the jury not to improperly use the
evidence on its own. The only mechanism available is limiting
instructions, although many trial lawyers doubt the effectiveness of
instructions and some believe instructions are counterproductive. But
as long as the law makes subtle distinctions, such as approving
consideration of pre-Miranda but not post-Miranda silence, the courts
will have to trust juries with the power to make the law real or fiction.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting directly
or indirectly on a defendant's decision not to testify at trial. 208 Defense
attorneys routinely object to prosecution comments that appear to
indirectly comment on the failure of defendants to testify, often moving
for a mistrial. On appeal from the denial of the mistrial motion, the
legal test is whether the district court abused its discretion in determining "'whether the statement was manifestly intended or was of such a
character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be
comment on the failure of the accused to testify.' 20 9 This year's crop
of such cases suggests that the chance of reversal on this basis is not
great. In United States v. Muscatel1210 "the prosecutor referred to what
the defense had not proven and what the defense could not prove."2 '
In holding that the comment didn't violate the Fifth Amendment, the
court considered the prosecutor's clarification, which was offered after
the court interrupted.1 2 In United States v. Delgado,"3 the prosecutor said, "And what is the legitimate reason? I mean, did you hear a
legitimate reason for any of those four individuals to be at the Palmetto
Park Square shopping center?" 214 The objection was sustained, and a

207. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 285
U.S. 556 (1932).
208. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
209. United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1474 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
2723 (1994) (quoting United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1551 (11th Cir. 1992)).
210. 42 F.3d 627 (11th Cir. 1995).
211. Id. at 632.
212. Id.
213. 56 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 713 (1996).
214. 56 F.3d at 1368.
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curative instruction given, but the mistrial motion was denied. 21 5 The
court of appeals affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion, and noting the
curative instruction and the prosecutor's clarification. 16 In United
States v. Knowles21 7 the court of appeals held the comment "Did you
ever hear an explanation for that?" to be a comment on defense counsel's
failure to argue and not the defendant's failure to testify.218 And in

Baxter v. Thomas,211 a murder case, the court considered this remarkable statement: "Now ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this case would
have been a lot more complete if we had one more witness and that
witness would have been sitting right here. But, for the defendant,
Norman Darnell Baxter, this case is in the posture that it is."220 The
court of appeals found that the prosecutor "was merely describing the
circumstantial nature of the case" and that the jury was likely to view
the comment as relating to the murder victim, not Baxter.221 One is
left to wonder how a live victim could make a murder case "a lot more
complete."
B. Double Jeopardy
United States v. Butler222 involved a drug prosecution of a nineteen
defendants. 22 The court severed the cases into two groups for trial by
separate juries. 2 4 Eugene Gantt was one of the first group to go to
trial.225 After the jury was selected and sworn and jeopardy attached
226
to the defendants, all the defendants except Gantt pleaded guilty.

The prosecution then moved for a mistrial, presumably with the intent
of joining Gantt in the other half of the case.2 7 The court granted the
motion and ordered Gantt to trial with the second group.228 Counsel
for Gantt not only objected to the declaration of the mistrial, but moved
to dismiss the indictment before Gantt's trial on double jeopardy
215. Id at 1369.
216. Id.
217. 66 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1449 (1996).
218. 66 F.3d at 1162.
219, 45 F.3d 1501 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 385 (1995)..
220. 45 F.3d at 1508. The prosecutor's statement is rife with ambiguity, some of which
flows from the punctuation in the transcription. Is it "But, for the defendant, Norman
Darnell Baxter.. ."? Or is it "Butfor the defendant, Norman Darnell Baxter. .
221. Id.
222. 41 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir. 1995).
223. Id. at 1439.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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grounds.229 Of course, a mistrial may be granted after the attachment
of jeopardy only in cases of "manifest necessity."" 0 The court of
appeals held that no manifest necessity existed and reversed Gantt's
conviction.28 ' In the face of Gantt's desire to proceed with the first
jury, the court found any paternalistic concerns about prejudice to Gantt
unpersuasive.2 32 The court also found that judicial economy is not a
sufficient justification for a mistrial.2'
C. Amendments to Indictments
The Fifth Amendment has been interpreted as limiting changes that
can be made to an indictment, 2 and this principle was applied in
2 5 The defendant in that case had been
United States v. Cancelliere.
Those counts
charged in two counts with money laundering.,
charged the defendant with committing the crimes "knowingly and
willfully."3 ' The defendant testified and based his defense on a lack
of fraudulent intent. 28 After the close of evidence, the government
moved to strike the word "willfully" from the two counts.2" 9 The
district court struck the word from the indictment.2 40
On appeal, the defendant argued that the redaction of the indictment
was an impermissible amendment that broadened the basis for the
defendant's conviction. 241 The government countered that the change
was merely a deletion of surplusage because willfulness is not mentioned
in the money laundering statute.242 In the abstract, the government
had the better of the legal argument, since the word "willfully" truly was
surplusage. But under the circumstances, the court of appeals held that
the deletion of the word impermissibly broadened the grounds for
conviction. 243 Most important to the court was that the defendant had
tailored his defense around the mental element and was prejudiced by

229. Id. at 1439-40.
230. Id. at 1441.
231. Id. at 1441-42.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628,634 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1628 (1991).
235. 69 F.3d 1116 (11th Cir. 1995).
236. Id. at 1118. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
237. 69 F.3d at 1120.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1121-22. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
242. Id. See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985).
243. 69 F.3d at 1121-22.
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Another factor was that the governthe late change in terminology.'
ment had framed the indictment, so it seemed unfair for them to make
a change which might possibly be critical to the defense.24 5 The court
also dismissed the suggestion that the inclusion of the word "intentional"
in the jury instructions rendered the change harmless.2" As a matter
of Fifth Amendment law, the court's conclusion is questionable. As a
practical matter, the lesson of Cancelliere is crystal clear: Prosecutors
should write indictments by tracking the proper statutory language and
redactions of surplusage will be treated with skepticism when the
changes appear to disadvantage a defendant who relied on the indictment.
IV. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Right of Confrontation
In United States v. Foree,247 discussed above, the court of appeals
was faced with an apparent Bruton' violation. The defendant
claimed that his Confrontation rights were violated when the government offered testimony of an admission by his co-defendant that
incriminated him.24 Although the co-defendant's statements never
mentioned Foree by name, there was other testimony that Foree was the
person mentioned in the statements.2' Indeed, the court of appeals
A.

found that "the jury was directly compelled to infer" that Foree was the
person mentioned in the statements. 25 ' Despite this, the court expressed doubt as to whether the statements in issue were the kind of
powerfully incriminating statements that would implicate the Confrontation Clause.2 52 This expression of doubt was never converted into a
holding that the statements were not sufficiently incriminating, and
such a holding would have been suspect, since the statements directly
implicated Foree in the drug activities alleged in the case.253
Ultimately the court did not have to hold that a Bruton violation had
not occurred because Foree's trial counsel had not objected on that basis
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43 F.3d 1572 (11th Cir. 1995).
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at trial. Therefore, the court applied the plain error standard, which
requires not only that a plain, clear, and obvious error be committed, but
also that the error is prejudicial and not harmless.2
Despite the
doubts expressed about the seriousness of the alleged error, the court
applied the plain error test assuming that there was a Bruton violation."5 The court then proceeded to hold that any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.2"
This conclusion was based on an
evaluation of the other evidence against Foree. 5 7 The court stated,
"We are persuaded, however, that the jury could have found Foree guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt even without [the co-defendant's] statements."' 8 Perhaps this statement was not precise enough, but the
real issue was whether the court believed beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury still would have convicted, not just whether it could have.
The decision in Foree certainly indicates that plain error claims based
on Bruton violations will face a slight probability of success.
B.

Right to Counsel
During 1995, the Eleventh Circuit issued several noteworthy decisions
concerning aspects of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In United
States v. Verderame259 the court of appeals addressed the issue of when
inadequate time to prepare a defense undermines the right to counsel.
In Verderame, a case involving narcotics conspiracy charges, there were
only thirty-four days between the defendant's arraignment and trial,
despite fairly substantial discovery material and repeated defense
requests for continuance. 2' Under the Speedy Trial Act, defendants
are guaranteed only thirty days of preparation time.26 1 Verderame's
claim, however, was constitutional; he contended that he was deprived
of the right to counsel because of the inability of his lawyer to adequately prepare.2 62 The legal test governing such a claim is whether the
defendant can establish that the denial of the motion for continuance
was an abuse of discretion that caused the defendant substantial
prejudice.2 The court of appeals reversed Verderame's conviction. 64
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Several factors were highlighted by the court. First, the case involved
some complexity and a significant amount of evidence.26 The case had
been investigated for several years and included an analysis of
Verderame's finances over a period of several years.2
Second, the
government's theory and evidence changed during the period between
arraignment and trial.267 The government had dismissed a second
conspiracy charge, refocusing its case.2'
The government also had
filed two bills of particulars, the second on the first day of trial that
added $2,400,000 in cash to the items the government intended
Verderame to forfeit. 269 Furthermore, the government continued 27to
provide additional discovery all the way up to the day of trial. 1
Third, Verderame was able to identify specific steps he was unable to
take in the preparation of his case because of the rush to get to trial.27 1
In particular, Verderame claimed that he needed to gather evidence of
businesses that he had bought and sold which would account for some
of the income the government argued were drug proceeds. 2 The court
of appeals found that in these circumstances, Verderame's requests for
additional time were reasonable. 273 The court recognized the need for
judges to manage large dockets of cases, but stated: "While we recognize
the heavy case loads under which the district courts are presently
operating and understand their interest in expediting trials, we feel
compelled to caution against the potential dangers of haste, and to
reiterate that the insistence upon expeditiousness in some cases renders
the right to defend with counsel an empty formality."274 The decision
in Verderame should create a strong incentive for district court's to be
receptive to defense requests for continuance, if only because the cost of
going to trial too quickly may be going to trial a second time. Of course,
the defense bar will see the opportunity to create an appellate issue by
making continuance motions that are denied, and so district courts
would be well advised to thoroughly inquire into the basis for such
motions.
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The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Cash275 contains
a lesson for district courts faced with defendants who want to represent
themselves at trial. That lesson is to engage the defendant in a very
thorough colloquy concerning the decision to proceed pro se. In Cash,
the defendant was charged with attempted murder of law enforcement
agents, use of a firearm to commit crimes of violence, and obstruction of
justice. 276 The charges arose from an incident that occurred when the
277
defendant forcibly resisted eviction form some condemned property.
An initial report by psychologists found that the defendant was not
competent to stand trial, but after a second evaluation, he was declared
competent.278 When the defendant asked to proceed pro se, the district
court engaged the defendant in a colloquy in which the court told the
defendant he had the right to defend himself and warned of the dangers
of doing S.279 The court also asked the defendant if he wanted to
represent himself in light of the judge's warnings, and the defendant
said he did. 2"
In assessing whether the record of the proceedings in the district court
reflected a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel, the court of appeals focused on the extent to which the record
2
showed the defendant's subjective understanding of the waiver. 11
The court engaged in a detailed analysis of the clues to the defendant's
level of appreciation of the choice he made. 1 2 The court reviewed each
of the factors set forth in Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright,2 1 the so-called
"Fitzpatrick factors" to be considered in evaluating the waiver of the
right to counsel.'
Those factors include the characteristics of the
defendant, the defendant's legal knowledge and experience, the possible
role of stand-by counsel, and the like. 285 Decisive in the court's
analysis was the defendant's mental problems, which had led to his
competence being called into question.'
In particular, the defendant
was diagnosed with a personality disorder that caused him to "overestimate and overstate his abilities."' 7 In light of the defendant's mental
275.
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problems, the court of appeals found that the district court's failure to
engage the defendant in a detailed and searching colloquy left the record
inadequate to conclude that the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent.'
The court of appeals noted that the district court did not
specifically 28 consider
the "Fitzpatrick factors" in its colloquy with the
9
defendant.
United States v. Jones290 involved a situation in which the defendant
claimed he was denied his right to counsel because his trial counsel was
laboring under a conflict of interest. The defendant, an attorney, was on
trial for extortion charges arising from a bribery scheme. 291 During
the presentation of the government's case, the government turned over
to Jones a grand jury transcript of a government witness.2" Jones's
trial counsel discovered that another of his clients (also an attorney) had
been under investigation for conduct similar to that for which Jones was
on trial.293 Jones's trial counsel concluded that a selective prosecution
argument could have been raised on Jones's behalf because Jones was
black and the other client was white.29 However, Jones's counsel
concluded that he was under a conflict of interest, since raising the
selective prosecution claim on Jones's behalf might cause the government
to indict his other client.295 Jones's counsel moved to withdraw and for
a mistrial and both motions were denied.2 9
The court of appeals began its review of the case by agreeing that
Jones's trial counsel had a conflict of interest.297 However, the court
concluded that the conflict of interest only affected the lawyer's handling
of the selective prosecution issue, a claim the validity of which is
reviewed de novo by an appellate court.298 The court then framed the
following question of first impression: "[Dloes an attorney's conflict of
interest require reversal of a conviction if the conflict of interest
adversely affected his performance only as to an affirmative defense the
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validity of which can be redecided by the court without a new trial?"20
The court held that reversal of the conviction is not required unless it
was determined that the selective prosecution defense had merit.' °
The court reasoned that the conflict of interest in no way affected Jones's
counsel's conduct of the trial; the only issue influenced was the decision
of whether to make a motion to dismiss the indictment based on
selective prosecution. 0 ' The court went on to analyze the selective
prosecution issue, and found the record on appeal was sufficient to
decide the issue without a remand."°2 Critical to the court's rejection
of the selective prosecution claim was a submission made by the government to supplement the record, namely, evidence that the white attorney
whose non-prosecution was the basis for the possible claim had, in fact,
been prosecuted on extortion charges.0 ' Although the opinion in Jones
states that the indictment and conviction of the white attorney occurred
"[slince Jones's trial," there was no indication that the prosecution might
have been motivated in some way by the issue raised by Jones's
attorney.3
C.

The Right to a Jury: The FairCross Section Requirement
One Eleventh Circuit decision involved the unusual circumstance of
a defendant in a drug prosecution objecting to the lack of police officers
as prospective jurors. In United States v. Terry 5 the defendant, a
deputy sheriff, was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The
defendant made a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that
federal law exempts police officers from serving on grand juries and trial
juries, thereby denying the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to
juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community. 6
In addressing Terry's claim, the court of appeals noted that a fair cross
section violation occurs when a group excluded from service is a
"distinctive group in the community," the group's representation is not
fair in relation to its size, and "the under-representation is due to the
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process."0 7
While the exclusion of occupational groups may seem to run afoul of
these criteria, the court of appeals found that the caselaw supports the
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conclusion that exempting certain occupations from service for policy
reasons does not violate the fair cross section requirement. 8
The
court stated, "We accept that allowing police officers to perform their
duties without the interruption of jury service is good for the community
(for example, many police forces have only a few officers to begin with)
and hold that the exemption of police officers is reasonable."
United States v. Grisham"° also involved a challenge based on the
fair cross section requirement. Grisham, a bank robbery defendant,
moved to strike the jury panel based on under-representation of AfricanAmericans.1 0 In reviewing Grisham's claim, the court of appeals, in
an opinion by Judge Johnson, conducted a detailed analysis of both the
grand jury and petit jury selection plans for the Northern District of
Alabama."'
Both plans involve random selection of thousands of
potential jurors from lists of registered voters.3 12 The court held that
Grisham had failed to show that the representation of African-Americans
was not fair in relation to their population in the community.3 3 The
court applied a simple test .from prior cases: If the disparity of the
proportion of jurors from a distinctive group and the proportion of the
group's presence in the population exceeds 10%, then a finding of underrepresentation is warranted. 1 4
When examining the percent of
African-Americans eligible for jury service in the Northern District of
Alabama (18.31%) with the percent of African-Americans in the grand
jury pool (15.9%) and the petit jury pool (13.59%), the court found that
the jury selection scheme passed the "10% test."1 5 But Grisham
advanced another argument: He contended that the relevant community
to survey was not the entire district, but the Congressionally created
subdivision of the district in which he was prosecuted. 36 An examination of the statistics concerning the Southern Division of the district,
where Grisham was tried, showed that the disparities exceeded 10%.' 7
The court rejected Grisham's claim that compliance with the fair cross
section requirement be judged based on the subdivisions of a district.31 8 The court noted that the "vicinage provision" of the Sixth
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Amendment explicitly gave Congress the power to determine the areas
from which juries would be drawn."1 9 The court was not persuaded
that the Congressional creation of subdivisions to the judicial districts
was an exercise of its power to determine vicinage under the Sixth
Amendment. 20 The court found no indication that the creation of the
321
subdivisions was intended to create division-based jury selection.
Therefore, the court held that "the relevant statistical community was
the Northern District rather than the Southern Division" and that
were not under-represented according to the 10%
African-Americans
2
32

test.
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